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Nonsense and Unmusic    
Daniel Albright
First thing.
Without nonsense there is no sense. Without sense there is no nonsense. 
Without sense there is no sense. Without nonce there is no once. Without 
out end there is no begin in. Without redundancy the waves would surge 
in one direction only.
Second thing.
I want to play a language game with you, a game that starts with a passage 
from a story by Jorge Luis Borges, concerning a man with an absolutely 
perfect memory:
Me dijo que hacia 1886 había discurrido un sistema original de numeración 
y que en muy pocos días había rebasado el veinticuatro mil. [ . . . ] En 
lugar de siete mil trece, decía (por ejemplo) Máximo Pérez; en lugar de 
siete mil catorce, El Ferrocarril; otros números eran Luis Melián Lafinur, 
Olimar, azufre, los bastos, la ballena, el gas, la caldera, Napoléon, Agustín 
de Vedía. En lugar de quinientos, decía nueve. [ . . . ] Yo traté de explicarle 
que esa rapsodia de voces inconexas era precisamente lo contrario de un 
sistema de numeración. Le dije que decir 365 era decir tres centenas, seis 
decenas, cinco unidades: análisis que no existe en los “números” El Negro 
Timoteo o manta de carne. Funes no me entendió o no quiso entenderme.
He told me that in 1886 he had thought up his own original numbering 
system, and that in a very few days he had gone past the number 24,000. 
[ . . . ] Instead of 7013 he would say, for example, Máximo Pérez; instead 
of 7014 he would say The Railroad; other numbers were Luis Melián 
Lafinur, Olimar, sulfur, the saddle pads, the whale, the gas, the cooking 
pots, Napoleon, Agustín de Vedía. Instead of 500 he would say nine. 
[ . . . ] I tried to explain to him that this rhapsody of disconnected words 
was precisely the opposite of numbering system. I told him that to say 
365 was to say three hundreds, six tens, five ones; an analysis that doesn’t 
exist in the “numbers” The Negro Timoteo or meat blanket. Funes didn’t 
understand me or didn’t want to understand me. 
The game is to reverse Borges’s premise: to imagine a language that consists 
entirely of numbers, by taking the Oxford English Dictionary and assigning 
numbers to each of its more than 200,000 words. (171,476 words in current 
use, and 47,156 obsolete words, in the second edition.) So aardvark would 
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be word number 10; zymurgy would have a very high number. If a new 
word were added to the language we could place it with decimal point 1, 
or 2, and so forth, added to the number of the word preceding it in the 
alphabet. Plurals and verb tense and numbers and moods could be indicated 
by pronouncing a suffix such as plus or tilde or backslash after the word–
number. So speech would consist of a string of numbers. It would take a long 
time to say a sentence, but if signifiers are perfectly arbitrary, it would be as 
easy to use as our normal version of the English language, for two people 
with a lot of time on their hands. And it would have the advantage that 
you write could poems with indeterminate words, such as 86,x5y, thereby 
creating a new form of discourse unavailable in standard English. But normal 
forms of nonsense, in the Jabberwocky or Finnegans Wake manner, would 
be impossible: you couldn’t create a portmanteau between lithe and slimy, 
because you can’t elide two numbers in the way that you can elide two words. 
And there is no reason why the phonetic aspect of the word couldn’t erode 
away into almost nothing: as numbers became the common medium of 
speech, you would need no sounds except those needed to pronounce the 
numbers. Eventually the word aardvark wouldn’t exist; there would only be 
10, meaning an ant–eating snouted African beast. But ant, and eating, and 
snouted, and African, and beast, would also exist only as numbers. Maybe 
all connection between the numbers and the concepts they were designed 
to represent would ultimately become wispy to the verge of non–being, and 
language would become Jacques Derrida’s dream system, self–enclosed, 
hermetically sealed.
But of course this number–language is ridiculous. Anyone can have a 
voculabury of 10,000 words or more; but no one except a few memory 
freaks could memorize a number corresponding to each of 10,000 different 
words. I suppose that if two memory freaks raised a child together, speaking 
only in number–language from the child’s birth, the chief effect would be 
to impoverish the child’s vocabulary utterly, to reduce it to a few hundred 
number–words at best. 
I believe that the fairy language I’ve just outlined shows something about 
the nature of real language. Where each word is uniquely and unequivocally 
specified, each word lacks the play between sense and nonsense, between 
correctness and error, between pointed articulation and mouth–slush, the 
play that’s necessary for language to live and be significant. A word can light 
up with sense only if surrounded by a penumbral region of half–sense, and 
an outer darkness of nonsense.
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There is an old story about a comedians’ convention where the jokes are so 
familiar that they are known by numbers, thus sparing the expense of time 
required to tell them. One comedian calls out 37! and everyone laughs. Then 
another calls out 82! and everyone laughs. Then a third calls out 59! and no 
one laughs. A spectator turns to another and asks why no one laughed; the 
other spectator says, Oh, they’ve all heard that joke before. A language of 
numbers would in fact not tend to promote much wit, or irony, or pictorial 
vividness, or melody, or rhythm. It would be a language perfectly intelligible 
to simple electronic devices, but at the same time, from a human perspective, 
it would unlanguage itself utterly.
A language of numbers lacks many things, but what it most lacks is a sense 
of the interrelatedness of the each element in the whole tissue of language. 
The word doubt is based on duo, the Latin word for two, and this being–of–
two–minds may be only dimly felt in common speech, but duoness extends 
through a huge range of words, including duple, dual, duet, redouble, and 
through cognates from Greek such as dyad, hendiadys, and so on. Through 
such roots words become deeply affiliated with one another, and form a 
cloth—we might use a Latinate word for cloth, namely text—that extends 
to the limits of speech. This billow of words may in some sense have drifted 
off into the upper atmosphere, since there is scarcely one word secularly 
tethered to the earth of physical objects—if language is as arbitrary as we 
think it is. But the texture of language–as–a–whole is infinitely self–enfolded 
and black with interconnections between words, like a star–map in which 
lines, some thick, some thin, are drawn from each star to every other star. 
This texture so closely imitates the texture of the world of experience, the 
physical world, that language as a total system is congruent with nature, 
even if it nowhere impinges on nature. I’m not saying that nature has a 
vocabulary or a grammar; I’m only saying that the manner in which every 
word touches every other word imitates the manner in which every minute 
particular in the universe touches every other minute particular. Words also 
exert a gravitational force on one another, in a way impossible to a language 
of numbers. Sense itself might be defined as that gravity.
Next thing.
There are two ways in which a word tends to spiral out of the domain of 
sense. The first is phonetic: the word breath exists in the center of a nest of 
words that sound like it, including breast, bath, bread, bled, and of course 
death. The more I surround a word with its congeners, the more nonsensical 
it becomes. This is the secret behind that underrated form of discourse, the 
tongue–twister: if I say Six slick skinks slink, it’s extremely hard to understand 
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what I’m saying: the words whirl into a kind of verbal reptile pâté, in which 
there’s scarcely a finite lizard to be found anywhere. 
The other way in which a word loses its purchase on meaning is through 
metaphor. If I equate a word with another, I make a muddle, sometimes a 
fascinating muddle, of their individual senses. I. A. Richards was especially 
sensitive to the blendedness of the two terms of a metaphor:
the vehicle is not normally a mere embellishment of a tenor which is 
otherwise unchanged by it but that vehicle and tenor in co–operation give 
a meaning of more varied powers than could be ascribed to either. (I. A. 
Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1936), p. 100)
This commingling can be described as a gain of power in the new bi–terminal 
entity, but it can also be described as a loss of power in each of the original 
terms, which are drained in order to energize the metaphor. If I recall Zuhair’s 
famous metaphor, Destiny is a blind camel, the camel loses its hump, its 
splayed feat, its resistance to desert conditions—it is a clumsy ugly thing, 
and not much else; and destiny loses any positive force, force for promoting 
happiness, that it might, on certain occasions, possess.
These two forms of loss of meaning meet in what we call poetry. Through 
assonance and consonance and rhyme and direct repetition of words, the 
field of sound keeps shrinking. Poetry is about doing the same thing over 
and over—it doesn’t matter if the thing is a stanza–form, or paired alliterative 
half–lines, or accentual feet, or quantitative feet—for every restriction of 
sound–range or rhythm tends to make the sense of the words more elusive. 
Saussure spoke of differentiation of the phonic stream as the source of 
language—as he put it, “A language is a system of differences with no positive 
terms”; “Considered in itself, the phonic sequence is nothing but a line, a 
continuous ribbon, in which the ear perceives no clear or precise divisions; 
in order to segment it, appeal must be made to meanings [significations]. . . . 
But when we know what sense and what role must be attributed to each 
part of the chain, then we see the parts detach themselves from each other, 
and the shapeless ribbon is cut up into pieces.” But poetry reinstates the 
continuous ribbon insofar as we attend to the phonic sequence and not to 
the meanings. What language does, poetry undoes. Poetry restores liquidity 
and smoothness to the choppy phonic stream, by narrowing the span, the 
variedness, of the sounds produced by throat and mouth. It is not poetic 
to say that a rose is a large, many–petalled flower, typically red, white, or 
yellow, and often scented, a sentence that requires a great many phonemes; it 




Poetry’s reliance on metaphor produces a similar effect. Yeats wrote a short 
story about a young king on whose head feathers grew instead of hair. This 
king was preternally wise, and his wisdom manifested itself, as the story 
says, in this way:
 . . . from being curious about all things he became busy with strange 
and subtle thoughts which came to him in dreams, and with distinctions 
between things long held the same and with the resemblance of things 
long held different.
When you think about it, the feather–headed king was doing what all of 
us do, for the whole body of speculative discourse in the humanities can 
be understood as saying that the similar things are different, and different 
things are the same. I mention this because metaphorical poetry tends to do 
only the second of these processes: to make likes out of unlikes. In one sense 
poetry narrows the semantic field by this squashing–together of disparate 
things—by dissolving, diffusing, and dissipating all the felt particulars of the 
universe, as Coleridge put it. In another sense poetry opens up new semantic 
horizons. In Kubrick’s film 2001: A Space Odyssey, the astronaut moves 
toward Jupiter at enormous speed, whizzing between two narrow planes 
full of nameless colors and writhing shapes. Poetry is like that: a narrowing 
of the domain of meaning and an entry into a vertigo of meaning, both at 
the same time. Poetry is language playing with unlanguage. The essential 
poetic act is a dispossessing of meaning that doesn’t culminate in complete 
meaninglessness.
Third thing.
Does language have a goal? Is there a terminus to language, a conclusion 
of the labor of making new words? Will the dictionary expand indefinitely, 
or is their a limit?
Consider for a moment the whole body of nouns. Obviously if a new object 
comes into existence, there will have to be a new noun, or a new definition 
of an old noun—maybe it’s even true that without that new word or new 
definition, we couldn’t really say that a new object has come into existence. 
Can a tree fall in the forest in the absence of the word tree?
The parsing of existing objects into new classes is also a source of new nouns. 
If I notice that many worms are round, I can create the word roundworm to 
describe them. One new word. If I want a fancier term suitable to a worm’s 
dignity, I can call them nematodes, that is, thread–like beings. Another new 
word, more or less the synonym of the first, on a higher level of diction. If 
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I notice that nematodes can be grouped among other animals that have a 
certain sort of odd body cavity, I can refer to nematodes as a member of the 
class of pseudocoelomates. A really big new word. I can also notice that all 
nematodes are not alike, and I can divide them into various subclasses. There 
are five clades (as these subclasses are called) among nematodes: these are 
the dorylaimia, the enoplia, the spirurina, the tylenchina, and the rhabditina. 
Five juicy and impressive new words. But of course I have scarcely tickled 
the exoderm of all the words that the study of nematodes can provide. 
Incidentally, I thought that I had just made up the word exoderm, but I just 
looked it up in the OED and discovered that it is a real word.
There is a limit to this process, if not exactly a telos. Over one million differ-
ent species of nematodes are thought to exist, a fact that makes for a goodly 
number of nouns. And careful scrutiny of each nematode on the planet earth 
will ultimately be able to find discriminating features that set it apart from 
every other nematode. Then there will be an almost unthinkable number 
of new nouns, since 90% of the animal life on the ocean floor consists of 
nematodes. Of course, if a different noun is assigned to every member of a 
class, we usually call it not a noun but a proper name. The nematode Jim.
In the eighteenth century Giambattista Vico considered the problem of a 
language made up entirely of proper nouns—what I have been calling the 
limit of language. Vico noted that Homer spoke of a language of the gods 
that differs from the language of men: for example, the river near Troy is 
called Scamander by men, but Xanthus by the gods. Vico also says:
 . . . we cannot doubt that the Roman Varro devoted himself to studying 
this language of the gods, and diligently collected the names of some 
30,000 gods, as Axiom 30 states. These names must have furnished a 
copious divine lexicon, sufficient for expressing all the needs of the people 
of Latium, which in that simple and frugal age must have been limited to 
the few necessities of life. The Greeks too reckoned 30,000 gods, as Axiom 
30 states: for they saw deities in every rock, spring, brook, plant, and reef, 
including the nature spirits called dryads, hamadryads, oreads, and napeas. 
In precisely this way, the American Indians regard as gods everything that 
is beyond their limited grasp.
The language of the gods is unthinkably rich, and calls attention to the 
poverty of normal language; Vico points out that in the Odyssey there is a 
certain herb that has no name in human speech, but is called moly in the 
language of the gods. In the language of the gods, everything, everything has 
a name, even things that are nameless to us. We live in the tiny congested 
world of the namable, of the things our limited brains can grasp; the gods’ 
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reach is infinite, and so is their vocabulary. If there is a name for every single 
object on earth, the set of these names is the set of all proper nouns; and 
since proper nouns, as we know them, often presuppose some animate or 
precious presence, then there is a spirit or nymph or god behind each rock, 
spring, brook, plant, or reef. In this way the act of carrying language to its 
nomenclatural extreme itself creates a fully panpsychist universe. To make 
up a word is to make up a deity.
But of course this sort of fairy language, a language in which there is a 
different word for each blade of grass, and each aphid on each blade of 
grass, is no language at all. Just as Funes’s invention of a separate word for 
each number disables any possibility of mathematics, so the invention of a 
separate word for each discernable object disables any possibility of thought. 
In Swift’s Lagado, the pedants converse in silence, by carrying around a big 
pack of various things, and taking out (say) a rock and pointing to it when 
they want to indicate a rock. But presumably that rock stands for the whole 
class of all things rocky. If the pedants of Lagado were gods speaking the 
language of the gods, in which each word is unique and divine, they would 
have to carry the whole cosmos on their backs.
A language of the gods is a sad, even a tragic idea, because it eliminates 
meaning. In the Cratylus, Socrates toys with the notion of an ideal language, 
a language of correct, non–arbitrary, immutable names: he decides that such 
a thing is impossible, because a name cannot be an inviolable aspect of a 
thing’s reality—if a thing is to be rightly, irrefutably named, there needs to 
be a fundamental resemblance, indeed a perfect correspondence, between 
the name and what it refers to. But to Socrates the idea that a word can be 
equivalent to an object is ludicrous: 
 . . . how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if they were 
exactly the same with them! For they would be doubles of them, and no 
one would be able to determine which were the names and which were 
the realities. (432d)
The language of the gods is a language in which names are exact doubles 
of things—not doubles of concepts, as Saussure would have it (since there 
aren’t any concepts or categories or classes or generalities or Platonic ideas), 
but doubles of things. Or if there is a sense in which the names still refer 
to concepts, the physical object’s concept is so inextricably one with the 
physical object itself that the distinction between them is trivial. The object 
is a reification of its name, and the name is a fluid or phlogiston circulating 
within the object, just as divinity saturates a fetish or totem with its presence. 
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But as Socrates suggests, in the perfect language either the name or the 
thing is redundant. One or the other could wither away without any loss. 
But language is what makes us human; we could dispense with the physical 
world, but we could never dispense with language. Ultimately language 
would suffice to satisfy our appetite for reality, and we could live purely in 
the domain of words, so adequate would language have become. In this way 
we would cover, obscure, and ultimately destroy the world by drawing on 
top of it an opaque one–to–one map (of course I’m alluding here to another 
Borges parable). This would be sensible, in that its infinite inflections would 
correspond exactly to the real world, if the real world still existed; but it 
would also be nonsense, since no word has any relation to any other word, 
and since the real world no longer exists.
I wonder if I feel a slight shiver as I write of the language of the gods because 
I suspect that our language, so crammed with words, rammed with words, is 
already something like a language of the gods. Maybe even normal speech is 
so adequate that we already live in a placeless place, where nothing is solid 
and we can walk through walls, since the word wall is soft and yielding. You 
and I are literary folk, and our lives may seem most real when we are lost 
in the world of our talking and reading, a world often quite remote from 
our actual circumstances—the word actual in quotation marks. But there 
are no more quotation marks, since the whole universe exists in a continual 
ache of quotedness. 
Next thing.
I’ve been speaking of the nonsense created by carrying language too far 
toward the imaginary conclusion of its efforts to be a complete elucidation 
of the universe. But there is also an opposite sort of nonsense, derived 
from language’s surrender, its giving up all its claims to treat what might be 
smilingly called reality. 
Is there any condition in which human beings would have no further use for 
speech? I can only think of one. I will describe this condition soon.
In Plato’s Symposium, Diotima says that Love is the child of Poverty and 
Plenty. Language has the same parents—maybe language is like its brother 
Love in many ways. Language is the child of Plenty because it endlessly 
exuberates, bears new children by a kind of parthenogenesis—the dictionary 
grows fatter and fatter every year. But language is also like its mother Poverty, 
because its very condition of being is absence. If there’s a chicken in my 
front yard, and I want to refer to it, I have only to point to it and the deed 
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is done; I need the word chicken only if no local chicken is available to be 
pointed to. The word chicken is a kind of surrogate for an absent chicken.
So—if a chicken accompanied me in all my travels, my need for the word 
chicken would vanish. I could point to her whenever I wished, and say, She 
lays lots of eggs. But if I had an egg in my pocket, I could point to the chicken, 
and point to the egg, and just say Lots. This is the model of language that led 
to Swift’s spoof of the pedants in the Academy of Lagado, lugging around 
their bags of miscellaneous objects.
Let me play a language game in which I try to take Swift’s model one step 
further. What if chickens were so abundant that I had no need to refer to 
them at all? Where everyone has plenty of chickens, I’d have no use for a word 
for chicken, just as a fish doesn’t have any use for a word for water—water is 
just existence itself, part of the stamina of things. The Inuit do not need 57 
words for snow: they don’t need a word for snow at all. So in a completely 
rich world, language might atrophy into something divine, a language of 
the gods in exactly the opposite sense from Homer’s.
I’ve tried to express this condition by making up a parable:
The names of the gods are common nouns that have lost their referents. An 
Asiatic tribe sets out across the Pacific to settle on a tropical island. The word 
ice, which once signified a matter–of–fact desolation of river and ocean, 
now attenuates, grows terrifying and monstrous, signifies an unheard–of, 
nearly inconceivable, absence of heat and liquidity. There exists a place where 
water turns rigid, and shuddering to the touch, but no one has been there, 
it is unthinkably distant, the kingdom of the dead; in this manner the word 
ice becomes a divine attribute or itself a divinity. Life is so easy—the fruit 
so overflows with oozy ripeness that one lies underneath the tree and thick 
pearls drop into one’s mouth—that vocabulary dwindles, grows flabby and 
blubbering without the pressure of survival to give point and precision to the 
articulation of words; why should a tongue so satisfied strain itself against 
palate or teeth, why should a throat greased with such unction of delight tense 
itself into vowels? Speech is reserved for certain ceremonious occasions only; 
arctic rituals, the dissection of imaginary whales, are celebrated by rites of 
discussion; the old formulas for sharpening harpoons are rehearsed, though 
no one would recognize a harpoon if it washed up on a beach. Though their 
condition is best denoted by the word satisfaction—if there were a gate to the 
island it would have that word engraved upon it—the word has grown dim, 
unintelligible, for lack of its opposite; beauty cannot exist where everything 
pleases the eye. Yet the appetite for speech is great even at the limit of 
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monotony: once a year they gather in temples erected for the sole purpose 
of pronouncing their words, words of which all but pronunciation is lost; 
their mouths ache with the strange effort of speech—How are you? I’m fine, 
how are you? It’s chilly today, I think it might storm—but they believe that 
they are miming the roles of gods, as if words were themselves Pentecostal 
tongues of flame. Words are now entirely divine, set aside for sacred usage, 
and it is correct to regard them so, for every meaningless word is divine, 
every meaningful word chained to the hell to which it refers.
Enough, then, on extrapolations of language into nonsense.
Part two.
There is another way that language can turn into nonsense: by creating 
antidotes to meaning, procedures that cancel out a previous meaning. 
Oxymoron and aporia are among these procedures: one word or statement 
is abutted against its opposite, black against white, producing a uniform 
textual gray. Oxymoron is Greek for sharp–dull, and the dullness erodes 
the blade into nothing at all. A tissue of oxymorons becomes a piece of 
text–cloth consisting entirely of holes, as a passage in the first scene of Romeo 
and Juliet will illustrate:
Misshapen chaos of well–seeming forms! 
Feather of lead, bright smoke, cold fire, sick health! (1.1.185–86)
Coleridge, the greatest theorist of the oxymoron, quotes Romeo’s lines and 
observes that here we have
an effort of the mind, when it would describe what it cannot satisfy itself 
with the description of, to reconcile opposites and qualify contradiction, 
leaving a middle state of mind more strictly appropriate to the imagina-
tion than any other, when it is, as it were, hovering between images. As 
soon as it is fixed on one image, it becomes understanding; but while it 
is unfixed and wavering between them, attaching itself permanently to 
none, it is imagination.
  Such is the fine description of Death in Milton:–
     The other shape, 
  If shape it might be call’d, that shape had none 
  Distinguishable in member, joint, or limb, 
  Or substance might be call’d, that shadow seem’d, 
  For each seem’d either: black it stood as night;
  Fierce as ten furies, terrible as hell, 
  And shook a dreadful dart: what seem’d his head 
  The likeness of a kingly crown had on.
     Paradise Lost, Book II
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The grandest efforts of poetry are where the imagination is called forth, 
not to produce a distinct form, but a strong working of the mind, still 
offering what is still repelled, and again creating what is again rejected; 
the result being what the poet wishes to impress, namely, the substitution 
of a sublime feeling of the unimaginable for a mere image.
In other words, the more abolished a text is, the more sublime: the applica-
tion of violence necessary to annihilate meaning is the highest form of 
verbal art. Never has nonsense received a higher compliment. Not only is 
the unimaginable substituted for a mere image: also an unword is achieved 
through two words that cancel each other out.
There are other ways of self–canceling in the realm of language. In Samuel 
Beckett’s novel Watt, there are passages of what is sometimes called anti–
language, in which Beckett experiments with various ways of saying things 
backward. The culmination of this backwardness is this passage, in which 
Watt speculates about Mr. Knott, his mysterious benefactor:
Dis yb dis, nem owt. Yad la, tin fo trap. Skin, skin, skin. Od su did ned 
taw? On. Taw ot klat tonk? On. Tonk ot klat taw? On. Taw ta kool tonk? 
Nilb, mun, mud. Tin fo trap, yad la. Nem owt, dis yb dis.
This paragraph was generated by shoving an intelligible sentence through 
the looking glass, into a mirror–world of language. If you push it through 
the looking glass once again, you get a fairly sensible text:
Side by side, two men. All day, part of night. Dumb, numb, blind. Knott look 
for Watt? No. Watt talk to Knott? No. Knott talk to Watt. No. What then did 
us do? Nichts, nichts, nichts. Part of night, all day. Two men, side by side.
What interests me is the way in which the anti–language and the regular 
language, taken together, cancel each other out. If you take a photograph 
and superimpose it over its own negative, you get a blank surface—and that 
is what Beckett is doing in this passage. 
Part 2
In an isolated diary entry, Franz Kafka wrote the enigmatic phrase, The 
self–canceling–out of art. We’ve just looked at an example from the domain 
of language. But there are other examples in other artistic media.
Is it possible to cancel out a bodily gesture? Beckett, the greatest of self–
cancelers, had a scheme for achieving this. During the Berlin rehearsals 
of Waiting for Godot, as McMillan and Knowlson note, Beckett insisted on 
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“artificial movements,” and had Vladimir flex his muscles as he got up after 
the strange collapse onto the ground of Vladimir, Estragon, Pozzo, and 
Lucky; Beckett explained that “the ballet–like acting style tended to cancel 
out the action that was being presented.” It is odd to think of an action that 
manages to call itself into question, let alone one that cancels itself out; 
but Beckett tried to devise a style of movement that kept itself ironically 
disengaged from the very action that it sketched. Not only must words 
unword themselves, but actions must unenact themselves.
Fifth thing.
I’ve wondered whether self–cancelation is possible in the domain of music. 
This is difficult to imagine for several reasons: one of them is that music 
doesn’t seem to make sense in the way that spoken language or gesture makes 
sense, so it’s hard to see what exactly could be canceled out here. Let’s first 
talk about the ways in which music can make sense, before talking about 
how that sense can be undone.
Music, like spoken language, is a tissue of changing sounds, and is articulated 
into phrases. So it should be possible for the mind to chop this stream into 
sememes of some sort, just as in spoken language. But in fact this almost 
never works, because too many axes of variation exist in music. In a single 
measure, you may well notice superpositions of pitch, and changes of pitch, 
and changes of note duration, and changes of timbre. Too much is going 
on for the listener to be able to think of any unit in music as a word. Even 
in monophonic music, the kinds of continuity and discontinuity you find 
don’t lend themselves to apprehension as a collection of sememes. In general 
the more discontinuities you hear, the higher the potential for language to 
emerge; but a tissue of discontinuities is often thought of as unmusical. Still, 
conspicuously choppy music does exist. Composers like Beethoven who 
twist together extremely short phrases seem to write music with a certain 
linguistic charge: I can hear the first movement of the fifth symphony both 
as a peremptory attempt to say something and as an expression of frustration 
that the medium doesn’t lend itself to clearer speech.
When we turn to rhythm, the problem is that musical meters tend to be far 
too even to promote comprehension as a system of words. It is perfectly 
possible to transcribe language into a pure phenomenon of rhythm: the 
simplest example is Morse code. But, historically speaking, musical rhythms 
are monotonous. It isn’t until the final dance of Igor Stravinsky’s The Rite of 
Spring that rhythm starts to get complex enough to hover on the brink of 
semantics. Elliott Carter’s 1942 setting of Robert Frost’s “The Line–Gang” 
Daniel Albright
91
in fact has a Morse–code joke built into the piano accompaniment. But here 
Carter doesn’t seem interested in either reinforcing or resisting the particular 
meanings of the words of the poem by spelling out actual words in Morse 
code, as far as I can tell.
Music has several strategies for intensifying its semantic intensity: the 
most common is through kinesthesia, for by imitating the rhythms of the 
body—heart–beat, breathing, foot–tapping, maybe even blinking—music 
can become a kind of voodoo–doll, a simulation of physiology. But this is 
doing what language can do, rather than constituting a language in itself. 
In general I define music as a teasing of the linguistic areas of the brain that 
fails to terminate in real language.
But music does have procedures for self–canceling. In Beethoven’s ninth 
symphony, the last movement begins with what the Germans call a 
Schreckensfanfare, a terror–fanfare, a loudly dissonant phrase, followed by 
quotations of themes from the first three movements. It is as if Beethoven 
were drawing a huge red diagonal bar through the previous parts of the 
symphonies, unmusicking his own music. 
Next part.
If music’s self–cancelation were taken to its limit, it would require the ex-
istence of some sort of unmusic, something that could annihilate music in 
the way that a positron, colliding with an electron, makes first an explosion 
and then nothingness.
It is possible to conceive various ways in which music can undercut itself. 
In certain Medieval motets, a sacred text and a bawdy text were sung at 
the same time, producing a sort of canceling–out of affect. In setting of an 
unromantical text in Brecht’s Die Dreigroschenoper, Kurt Weill provides a 
swoony romantical melody, producing a similar canceling–out, but with 
a certain appetite for destruction probably not present in the thirteenth 
century. 
The ultimate goal of unmusic is, of course, silence. Silence is a surprisingly 
tricky concept: John Cage in fact argued that it couldn’t possibly exist:
In fact, try as we may to make a silence, we cannot. [. . .] I entered [an 
anechoic chamber] at Harvard University several years ago and heard two 
sounds, one high and one low. When I described them to the engineer in 
charge, he informed that the high one was my nervous system in operation, 
the low one my blood in circulation. Until I die there will be sounds. And 




It is as if silence were not a familiar absence of sound, but the goal of a 
Zen meditative process. According to Iamblichus, among mortal men only 
Pythagoras could hear the music of the spheres. But could there be an 
anti–Pythagoras, capable of hearing the silence beyond all the crystalline 
spheres of the heavens? 
I’ve wondered if I might find a way of experiencing actual total silence. In 
order to do this I must find not only an unmusic but an unsound, something 
that will remove every acoustic phenomenon, including the sound of my 
heartbeat and even the sound of my brain (which I’m not aware of ever 
having heard—you may insert your own joke here). And in fact technology 
has made considerable advances toward achieving this unsound, through 
noise cancelation technology. 
You can buy headphones that will provide a sort of antidote to the noise 
of an airplane’s engines, by creating a wave–form that exactly matches 
the wave–form of the plane’s roar, but out of phase, so that each crest of 
one wave is a trough of the other. Then there’s silence. But maybe a clever 
technician could construct headphones that would cancel out my heartbeat 
and my nervous system’s little stridulations, so that it would be the acoustic 
equivalent of the darkness at the bottom of Mammoth Cave. Then I would 
myself be the anti–Pythagoras.
I was also curious to learn whether you could construct, say, an anti–
Mozart’s–fortieth–symphony, which, when played at the same time as the 
Mozart, would yield a perfect nothing to the ear. So I wrote to an acoustic 
engineer, Tom Horrall, and asked him this question. He wrote back to me 
as follows:
Sound cancellation involves employing a correction signal which is out of 
phase with the unwanted signal or noise, leaving only the desired signal to 
be heard.  So the unwanted sound and the correction signal are one and the 
same but in anti–phase or opposite polarity.  The human ear is very poor 
at distinguishing two signals that differ only in polarity, so the correction 
signal and the unwanted signal to be eliminated would sound essentially 
the same, at least theoretically.  
So, there is indeed an anti–Mozart’s–fortieth–symphony, but it would sound 
exactly like Mozart’s fortieth that everybody knows. But if the anti–symphony 
and the symphony were played at exactly the same time, there would be 
silence, no Mozart, no symphony. Unsound is just sound, but seen through 
the looking glass. Our whole lives are surrounded by agitations in the air 
that we can construe either as sound or as sound’s opposite. And our texts 
are always sense and nonsense at the same time.
